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Charitable Tax Reform for the 21st Century
by Roger Colinvaux and Ray D. Madoff

Roger Colinvaux is a professor at the
Catholic University of America Columbus
School of Law, and Ray D. Madoff is a professor
at Boston College Law School.
In this article, Colinvaux and Madoff explore
two overarching policy goals of charitable tax
incentives and two recent developments that
are threatening to undermine them.
Copyright 2019 Roger Colinvaux and
Ray D. Madoff.
All rights reserved.
Charitable organizations play a fundamental
role in American society, fulfilling functions that
would otherwise fall to government, providing
creative solutions to society’s most pressing
problems, and serving our highest ideals. The
federal government has long provided generous
tax incentives for charitable donations, with

current benefits reaching up to 74 percent of the
amount of the gift.1 Unfortunately, however, the
design of the tax incentives is now woefully out of
step with their purpose and the realities of
charitable fundraising today, resulting in a system
that is incoherent, ineffective, and on the verge of
failure.
Taking a broad view, we believe that there are
two overarching policy goals of the charitable tax
incentives. The first is to promote actual charitable
work and the second is to foster a strong culture of
charitable giving with broad participation.
The fundamental purpose of providing
charitable tax benefits is to support charitable
work. If the good work of charities never gets
done, tax benefits are wasted, costing the
government significant revenue but providing no
benefit to the public. In order to encourage actual
charitable work, Congress based the giving
incentive on donors giving up dominion and
control of their donations. Only when donors give
up control are funds fully available for charities to
deploy in support of their mission.
The goal of promoting actual charitable work
was strongly reflected in the last major legislative
effort on charities — the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
The act drew a distinction between organizations
directly engaged in charitable work (like schools,
museums, churches, and food banks) and donorcontrolled organizations that do not engage in
charitable work but instead provide funding for
work done by others. Congress categorized the
first type as public charities and the second type as

1

These savings are possible for a gift of appreciated property in
which the donor has a zero cost basis. The charitable deduction will save
the donor 37 percent of the value of the gift; an additional 20 percent of
the value of the contributed property if it is subject to capital gains taxes;
and, if the donor is subject to estate taxes, another 17 percent (40 percent
of the remaining 43 percent) that would otherwise be remaining in the
estate if no gift had been made. The tax benefits can be even more if the
property is overvalued, a recurring issue for non-publicly traded assets.
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private foundations. To encourage the availability
of funds for current charitable work, Congress
provided greater tax benefits for contributions to
public charities than to private foundations.
Further, recognizing the perils of donorcontrolled entities actually getting charitable
work done, Congress imposed a wide array of
rules on private foundations to make sure they
would spend their funds for charitable use. These
include payout rules, strict self-dealing
restrictions, greater disclosure obligations, and
tough anti-lobbying rules. In short, the 1969 act
drew bright legal lines to increase the availability
of funds for active charities and to tightly regulate
passive, donor-controlled foundations to ensure
their operation in the public interest.
The other goal of charitable tax incentives is to
foster a strong culture of giving in America to
achieve a robust and dynamic charitable sector
reflective of our pluralistic society. Implicit in
subsidizing donations to charity is that giving
itself is a public good, apart from the actual work
any particular charity does. The more people
participate in giving, the broader the base of
public support for the charitable sector as a whole,
and a more dynamic and pluralistic sector results.
If only a few voices are encouraged to support the
charitable sector, charities will have to cater to a
narrow set of interests and lose a main source of
strength and legitimacy — widespread public
support.
Today, two major developments strike at the
heart of both policy goals and serve as a clarion
call to update and reform the charitable tax
benefits. First, the increase in the standard
deduction by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has meant
that far fewer Americans have incentives to give.
The drop has been dramatic. In two years, the
participation rate among taxpayers taking the
deduction has gone from 25 percent to just 8.5
2
percent. This dramatic change has the potential
not only to reduce giving but also to undermine

the legitimacy of the charitable sector as
representing a wide swath of the public.3 We have
already begun to see the effect of these changes on
donation totals and in patterns of giving, which
have become concentrated among the wealthiest
4
Americans.
Second, the growing use of donor-advised
funds (DAFs) is undermining the basic tenet of
the charitable tax system that tax benefits should
be based on making funds fully available for
charitable use. DAFs are financial accounts legally
held by a public charity sponsor, but effectively
controlled by donors. Donors get maximum tax
benefits upon contribution to the DAF sponsor,
yet funds held in DAFs are not truly available for
charitable use until the donors release their
advisory privileges. When donors use DAFs,
Congress can no longer count on the public
charity label to provide assurance that donations
formally made to public charities are actually
available for charitable use.
The public charity cloak of DAFs also allows
individual donors and private foundations to
avoid long-standing rules on payouts, disclosure,
and lobbying, which are all designed to promote
the public good. For example, a private
foundation can satisfy its payout obligation by
making a grant to a DAF, even though the money
remains in the DAF subject to the foundation’s
advisory privileges. The same grant also avoids
meaningful disclosure because the money coming
out of the foundation’s DAF will not be publicly
sourced to the foundation — creating a new kind
of dark money. Moreover, DAFs enable any
individual to create his own public charity simply
by funding it through a DAF, thereby avoiding the
anti-lobbying, self-dealing, and disclosure rules
otherwise applicable to organizations financed by
a small number of funders. The ability to opt out
of private foundation status at will makes a
mockery of our tax system and the complex
statutory rules providing different treatment for
private foundations and public charities.

3

2

James Andreoni and Jon Durnford, “Lost Your Charitable
Deduction in 2018? You Are Not Alone,” in “The Effects of the 2017 Tax
Reform on Itemization and the Charitable Deduction” (July 15, 2019).
The participation rate is not the same as the percentage of itemizers,
which dropped from 30 percent to 10 percent. Id. The rates of 25 percent
and 8.5 percent reflect itemizers who claimed the charitable deduction.
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For a discussion of some of the effects, see Roger Colinvaux, “The
Importance of a Participatory Charitable Giving Incentive,” Tax Notes,
Jan. 30, 2017, p. 605.
4

Emily Haynes and Michael Theis, “Gifts to Charity Dropped 1.7%
Last Year, Says ‘Giving USA,’” The Chronicle of Philanthropy, June 18,
2019.
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To summarize our concerns, the system of
charitable tax benefits is failing on three main
fronts: (1) current rules provide no giving
incentive for 90 percent of American taxpayers,
leaving charities reliant on a shrinking and
narrow base of support; (2) current rules no
longer provide any assurance that tax-benefited
donations will ever be made available for
charitable use; and (3) long-standing rules
designed to promote the public good (for
example, on payout, disclosure, and lobbying) are
easy to avoid through the use of DAFs.
Both of us have written numerous articles and
opinion pieces on ways to improve the tax rules to
make them fairer and work better for the people
who rely on charitable efforts,5 and there are
many ways to approach these complex issues. In
this article, we outline five proposals that we
believe provide the best ways to fix the problems
facing the charitable sector:
1. replace the current charitable deduction
with a credit for charitable giving available
for all taxpayers who give more than a
designated floor;
2. reform the rules applicable to DAFs so that
some tax benefits are conferred upon
transfer to a DAF while others are deferred
until the donation is no longer subject to
the donor’s advisory privileges;
3. reform private foundation payout rules to
close the loophole that allows a charity to
avoid private foundation status by
funding the charity through a DAF;
4. prohibit private foundations from
counting a grant to a DAF as satisfying
their 5 percent payout requirement,
require disclosure of foundation to DAF
grants, and bar foundations from counting
payments to insiders (such as travel and
compensation) as payments for charitable
purposes; and

5. reform the excise tax applicable to private
foundations to provide incentives for them
to increase their charitable expenditures.
Expand Availability of Charitable Tax Benefits
The charitable deduction has long been
criticized as unfair. As a deduction, the value of
the tax benefit increases with income. The higher
the marginal rate of the donor, the larger the tax
benefit, meaning that the wealthier the taxpayer,
the less they must pay for each dollar of their
charitable gifts. Thus, for a gift of $1,000, a
taxpayer in the 37 percent bracket gets $370 in tax
savings while a taxpayer in the 15 percent bracket
gets just $150 — a $220 difference in the size of the
tax benefit for the same gift. In addition, as an
itemized deduction, only a small fraction of
taxpayers actually have a tax incentive to give,
further increasing unfairness. Thus, millionaires
can get a return of 37 percent on their charitable
contributions, while a middle-income taxpayer
who claims the standard deduction gets no tax
benefit at all for a contribution of the same
amount. Such middle-income taxpayers thus have
no incentive to give, and when they do, their gift
is not acknowledged by the tax system even
though their sacrifice is likely greater relative to
their wealth.
These problems have been exacerbated by the
TCJA’s extraordinary increase to the standard
deduction. By reducing the number of itemizers
by two-thirds, just over 10 percent of taxpayers
are now eligible to claim the charitable deduction.
This will in all likelihood get worse as taxpayers
understand they can no longer claim a deduction
6
for their gifts. Further, with only the wealthiest in
society claiming charitable tax benefits, the
charitable sector will become less pluralistic and
7
more reflective of the interests of the donor class.
This is of great concern. A main strength of the
charitable sector is widespread public support
that is fostered by tax incentives. Although it is

5

See, e.g., Colinvaux, “Fixing Philanthropy: A Vision for Charitable
Giving and Reform,” Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 1007; Colinvaux, “Donor
Advised Funds: Charitable Spending Vehicles for 21st Century
Philanthropy,” 92 Wash. L. Rev. 39 (2017); Ray D. Madoff, “When Is
Philanthropy? How the Tax Code’s Answer to This Question Has Given
Rise to the Growth of Donor-Advised Funds and Why It’s a Problem,” in
Philanthropy in Democratic Societies 158-177 (2016); and Madoff and Lewis
B. Cullman, “The Undermining of American Charity,” The New York
Review of Books, 17-18 (July 14, 2016). Madoff, “5 Myths About Payout
Rules for Donor-Advised Funds,” The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Jan. 13,
2014.

6

Although causation is always difficult to prove, the most recent
statistics — showing a significant drop in charitable giving in the wake
of the TCJA — seems to be evidence of this decline. Andreoni and
Durnford, supra note 2, at 5.
7

A related concern is that nonprofits increasingly will opt out of
charitable status altogether and become more privately focused, and
even political, organizations. For additional discussion, see Colinvaux,
supra note 3.
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true that the base of support historically has been
tied to taxpayers who itemize (and thus to higherincome taxpayers), before 2017 that base still
amounted to roughly 30 percent of taxpayers — a
significant (and changing) segment of the
population. With only the wealthiest of the
wealthy among us now likely ever to claim a
charitable deduction, the fundamental public
character of charities is under threat.
Accordingly, to address the increased inequity
of the tax incentive and the danger to the sector
from increasingly narrow taxpayer participation,
we believe it is time to make the charitable giving
incentive available to all taxpayers by replacing
the deduction with a credit. A uniform credit
percentage, applicable to all, would provide a fair
and more transparent tax benefit. A gift of $1,000
would provide the same benefit, regardless of the
income level of the donor. To reduce the cost of the
expanded incentive, only gifts above a designated
floor would receive the tax benefit. A floor would
reduce the inefficiency of the current incentive,
which rewards each dollar of charitable giving,
but retain the incentive to give when it can have
the most impact: the point at which donors
actually need an incentive to give more. A floor
would also reduce administrative costs and tax
evasion. In sum, a tax credit for the charitable
giving of all taxpayers, subject to a floor, would be
an important step in favor of fairness,
transparency, and efficiency and would promote a
more robust charitable sector that reflects the
interests of all Americans.
Reform Tax Rules Applicable to DAFs
DAFs have grown from obscurity to
dominance in charitable giving. In 2017 (the most
recent year for which data are available), Fidelity
Charitable was the largest charitable fundraiser in
the United States, raising $6.83 billion, more than
8
twice as much as United Way. In 2017 the top four
DAF sponsors raised more than the top 10 nonDAF public charities combined.9

DAFs are popular because they provide
donors with the double benefit of (1) effective
ongoing control over donated funds, and (2) tax
benefits that can be far greater than would be
achieved by donating to a private foundation.
DAFs can be confusing because there is a
disconnect between their legal structure and how
they operate in practice. Legally, when a donor
transfers property to a DAF sponsoring
organization, the transfer is just like an outright
transfer to the Red Cross or a local food bank. The
donor technically gives up all control over the
donated property, including the right to direct
charitable transfers of the donated funds. In legal
parlance, the gift is considered complete because
the donor formally relinquishes dominion and
control over the property, thus enabling donors to
obtain full tax benefits for their transfer. But in
fact, despite the formal transfer of ownership
from the donor to the sponsoring charity, the
nature of the DAF is that the sponsoring charity
effectively allows the donor to retain ongoing
control over the charitable disposition and
10
investment of the donated assets. That ongoing
control is the reason why donors make
contributions to DAFs instead of making outright
non-DAF gifts to charities.
Because a donor to a DAF can give away
property while also retaining effective control, the
transferred property is functionally “between
ownership.” The donor has committed the
property to eventual charitable use and so can no
longer use the property to buy a yacht or for other
personal consumption, but the donor’s ongoing
advisory privileges prevent the property from
being truly available for use by any particular
charity. Moreover, under our current system
donors are under no obligation, and have no
incentive, ever to release their advisory privileges
to make the funds available for charitable use. The
problem is that DAFs effectively sever the link

10

Id.

These ongoing advisory privileges are built into section 4966(d)(2),
which defines a DAF as (1) a fund or account owned and controlled by a
sponsoring organization (2) that is separately identified by reference to
contributions of the donor or donors, and (3) the donor (or a person
appointed or designated by the donor) has or reasonably expects to have
advisory privileges over the distribution or investments of the assets.
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Drew Lindsay, “America’s Favorite Charities 2018,” The Chronicle of
Philanthropy, Oct. 30, 2018.
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between the granting of charitable tax benefits
and the provision of benefits to charities.11
Given the current popularity and dominance
of DAFs in the charitable fundraising world, it is
easy to forget the controversy that surrounded
their emergence and the conditions for their
acceptance. At the heart of the conflict was how to
characterize the DAF and the nature of donor
advice. If a DAF was a “donor-directed” fund,
whereby the donor could tell the sponsor how to
spend the money, no deduction would be allowed
because of retained control by the donor. But if a
donor’s role was truly advisory in nature,
whereby donors could offer suggestions and
guidance but not direct the distributions, a
deduction would be allowed. The IRS cautiously
accepted industry arguments that donors to DAFs
would not be allowed to direct distributions, and
on that basis allowed contributions to DAFs to
12
qualify for current charitable tax benefits. We
believe, however, that competition for funds
among DAF sponsors has made the distinction
between direction and advice formalistic and
without substance. Nobody transfers property to
a commercial DAF sponsor so that the sponsor
can make distributions on its own from the
donor’s DAF. Sponsors know that if they were to
exert significant control over DAF funds, the
“adviser” could simply “advise” that the funds be
transferred to another, more compliant, DAF
13
sponsor. As a result, DAFs are operated for all
intents and purposes at the donor’s direction.
Accordingly, we believe that to reflect the
reality of DAFs, current law should be revised to

11

There are many reasons why well-meaning donors may fail to
make significant distributions from their DAFs, including that (1)
charitable decisions are difficult and many donors have busy lives and
want to defer decision-making; (2) as noted by behavioral economists,
donors can feel good watching their DAF accounts grow (similar to
people’s feelings about retirement funds) and may experience a sense of
loss when their DAF accounts decrease as a result of charitable
distributions; and (3) DAF sponsors and financial advisers benefit
financially when assets remain in the DAF, which may cause them to
subtly encourage donors to think of DAFs as accounts to hold rather
than as funds to disburse (e.g., by encouraging donors to think of DAF
funds as a charitable legacy to be passed on to younger generations).
12

Concerned about donors abusing DAFs for personal benefit,
Congress in 2006 defined a DAF in terms of donor advisory privileges
and required a formal acknowledgment by DAF sponsors of their
independent ownership of donated sums. An unintended consequence
of codifying the DAF, however, has been largely to mute arguments by
the IRS that gifts to a DAF sponsor are not complete.
13

This might explain why The Economist found that the largest
recipient of donations from DAFs sponsored by Fidelity Charitable,
Schwab Charitable, and Vanguard Charitable was Fidelity Charitable.

restore the connection between the timing of the
charitable deduction and the availability of
donated funds for charitable use. We propose that
donors be given the estate and gift tax and capital
gains tax advantages when transferring funds to a
DAF (reflecting that DAF funds are no longer
available for personal use), but that the income tax
deduction be suspended until the funds are no
longer subject to advisory privileges and
14
therefore are available for charitable use. Once a
distribution from a DAF to a qualified charity
occurs (and advisory privileges are released), the
donor (if alive) would be allowed a charitable
deduction equal to the amount of the distribution.
Under this new rule, donors to DAFs would have
an incentive (the income tax deduction) to make
DAF funds fully available for charitable use by
making distributions from the DAF or releasing
advisory privileges. A donor may decide to wait
and accumulate funds tax free in a DAF before
distribution, in which case the charitable
deduction will also be postponed until the donor
is prepared to make a decision.
By returning the timing of the deduction to
the point at which a charity has effective use of the
donated funds, this change would promote the
purpose of the charitable deduction — to provide
funds for charitable use. Further, a deferred
deduction rule also ties the amount of the
deduction to the amount of cash ultimately made
available for charitable use. This has important
additional policy benefits, largely regarding
donations of property.
Among the main sources of DAF
contributions are property, including publicly and
privately traded stock, real estate, and a wide
variety of other items (for example, limited
liability company interests, cryptocurrency, and
15
grain). This is because donors get significantly
14

We have both argued previously for a change to the law that would
impose a payout term on DAFs. Although we continue to believe that a
strong payout rule would be a great improvement over current law, we
also think our current proposal (suspending the deduction until
advisory privileges are released) is a better solution because it more
accurately captures the economic realities of DAFs and avoids the
valuation problems associated with contributions of complex assets.
15

For example, Fidelity Charitable in 2015 reported receiving $2.95
billion in noncash contributions. See generally David Gelles, “How Tech
Billionaires Hack Their Taxes With a Philanthropic Loophole,” The New
York Times, Aug. 3, 2018 (discussing ways that donors use DAFs for inkind property contributions). DAF sponsors pepper their advertising
with solicitations for complex assets. See, e.g., Susan B. Garland, “How to
Donate Complex Assets,” Kiplinger (Mar. 2015).
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more tax benefits by making contributions of
appreciated property instead of cash and DAF
sponsors are eager to act as brokers to liquidate
the property. Although a contribution of cash can
save the donor as much as 37 cents for each dollar
donated, a contribution of appreciated property
can save the donor 57 cents for each dollar
donated (taking into account both capital gains
taxes and income taxes but not potential estate
taxes). Moreover, DAFs are especially attractive
for contributions of property other than publicly
traded stock (the industry refers to these as
complex assets) because if those assets are
donated to a private foundation, the donor’s
deduction is limited to basis. By donating
complex assets to a DAF, the donor can claim a
deduction based on the appraised fair market
value of the property at the time of gift.
Appraisals, however, are difficult to perform
accurately and can result in overvaluation of the
property, as well as excess (if not fraudulent)
deductions. Valuation is more an art than a
science and there is often a considerable range of
defensible values for property that does not have
a ready market. Being dependent on donors for
their fees, appraisers feel a natural pressure to
come up with higher values that will afford
donors better tax savings. Moreover, because of
the expense and difficulty of valuing property
that has no ready market value, it is virtually
impossible for the IRS to provide sufficient
oversight on valuation of those types of interests,
particularly when taking into account the
explosion of contributions that has occurred with
the rise of DAFs.16
Further, the current-law deduction for the
value of the appraised property, even when
accurate, allows donors to claim a tax benefit for
funds that will be spent on the preservation and
conversion of the asset to cash, rather than on the
amount of funds that are available for distribution
to charity. This means that a donor’s deduction is
likely to be greater than the amount that ends up

16

The many problems associated with donations of property (not just
with DAFs) has led one of us to question whether we should allow
charitable deductions for contributions of property (see Colinvaux,
“Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined,”
50(263) Harv. J. on Legis. (2013)) and, if deductions are allowed, whether
the amount of the deduction should be reduced to account for some of
the deducted appreciation (see Colinvaux, “Donor Advised Funds,”
supra note 5).

1872

being available for distribution. Depending on the
time that it takes to sell the property and the
expenses associated with the sale, there can be a
17
significant gap between those two numbers.
Delaying the deduction until the actual
distribution of cash avoids the need for
appraisals18 and bases the deduction on the net
benefit to charity, thus solving two of the principal
problems with DAF property donations: the
uncertainty and administrative cost associated
with appraisals, and the facilitation of deductions
greater than the amount available for charitable
use. Importantly, our proposal would allow
donors a deduction based on the distributed
amount, whether the value increases or decreases
from the time of the donation. Donors could then
reap the benefits if the property (including cash
invested after donation) increases in value over
time.
End Use of DAFs to Create Phony Public Charities
As noted previously, Congress in 1969 created
a clear division in charity law between public
charities and private foundations. Public charities
would be more lightly regulated than private
foundations and treated better for purposes of the
charitable deduction. The reasons were to
recognize the fundamental purpose of the
charitable deduction to increase the availability of
funds for charitable use, and the concern that
private foundations were more prone to abuse
given the opportunity for ongoing donor control.
One way the law categorizes organizations as
public or private is based on their sources of
support. If an organization is funded by a small
number of individuals, it is a private foundation.
Alternatively, if an organization can show that it
gets a lot of support from a variety of donors, it

17

Consider the case of a donor that has a condominium in an area
where the market is currently depressed. Assume the condominium has
an appraised value of $500,000. After donation, the DAF sponsor may
have to pay significant fees associated with the property, such as
property taxes, utilities, and condominium fees, and the eventual sale of
the property will require payment of transfer taxes and real estate
brokerage fees. After all these expenses are paid, only $400,000 is
allocated to the donor’s DAF even though the donor was allowed to take
a tax deduction based on a $500,000 appraised value. See Madoff, “Three
Simple Steps to Protect Charities and American Taxpayers From the Rise
of Donor-Advised Funds,” Nonprofit Quarterly, July 25, 2018.
18

Our proposal would base the amount of the deduction on the
amount of cash distributed from the DAF. If the DAF distributes noncash
property, the deduction would be zero.
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passes the public support test and qualifies as a
charity. In meeting this test, contributions from
existing public charities count as public support.
This rule has created the opportunity for
individuals to create their own public charities
simply by making their donations through DAFs.
Treasury has become concerned about this use
of DAFs to create phony public charities by
disguising the source of an organization’s
support.19 With public status, the charity can
avoid foundation restrictions on lobbying, selfdealing, and public disclosure of donors. The ploy
is easy to execute: a donor contributes to a DAF
and funds a new (or existing) charity from the
DAF instead of directly. Because the DAF
contribution technically is a contribution from a
public charity (and not from the donor-adviser),
the DAF contribution automatically counts as
public support. By contrast, if the contribution is
sourced to the individual donor-adviser, only
some of the support would be regarded as public
and the charity would need to show contributions
from many other donors to avoid being treated as
20
a private foundation.
The potential for abuse is considerable,
particularly when it comes to lobbying. Although
private foundations are generally prohibited from
lobbying,21 public charities can (with some
limitations) spend up to $1 million a year on
lobbying without penalty. If a donor wants to
lobby with tax-deductible funds, one way to do so
is to fund a DAF with a large contribution (say $20
million) and advise a $20 million grant to New
Charity created by the donor. New Charity
automatically qualifies as a public charity under
the support test because all its support is from a
public charity (the DAF sponsor). As a public
charity, New Charity makes an election under the
tax law (a section 501(h) election), which may
allow it to spend $1 million on lobbying
depending on its budget and expenses. New
Charity for the year spends $1 million on lobbying
and, to show that it has a charitable function, $19

million in a grant to a DAF, where it is ready to be
deployed to a new New Charity. The same pattern
can recur innumerably, with the $19 million grant
money being used over and over to establish a
base for the lobbying activity.
Other similar abuses are possible. One widely
reported use of a DAF to avoid private foundation
status involved former acting Attorney General
Matthew Whitaker. Before his appointment,
Whitaker was well compensated as the head of a
new charity that spent much of its money
attacking Hillary Clinton. The charity was funded
entirely by a DAF. Had the organization been a
private foundation, the public would have known
the source of Whitaker’s support, but as a public
charity the paper trail reveals only that the donor
22
is a DAF.
Questionable uses like these of public
charities not only skirt the law but also cause
serious harm to the reputation of the charitable
sector. We agree with the Treasury Department
that a common-sense approach would be to
provide that contributions of DAF assets do not
23
count as support from a public charity.
Close Payout Loophole for Private Foundations
In 1969 Congress became concerned that
private foundations were providing too many tax
benefits to donors without any assurances that
donated funds would benefit the public in a
timely manner. As a result, it enacted a rule that
required private foundations to distribute
roughly 5 percent of their assets each year to
24
public charities. Sensibly, the payout rule could
not be evaded by a private foundation making
distributions to other private foundations,
because the funds would simply await further
distribution by that foundation.
Since the rise of DAFs, some private
foundations have been meeting their payout

19

Notice 2017-73, 2017-51 IRB 562.

22

20

Under reg. section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(i), support from any one
individual counts as public support only to the extent that it does not
exceed 2 percent of the organization’s total support.
21

This prohibition is created through section 4945(d)(2) by imposing
an excise tax on all lobbying activities.

Madoff, “We Don’t Know Who Was Paying Matthew Whitaker, and
That’s a Problem,” The Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2018.
23

Treasury proposes a similar approach in Notice 2017-73.

24

Qualifying distributions also include funds spent directly for
charitable purposes.
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requirements by making grants to DAFs that are
established by the foundation.25 The foundation
can then advise distribution of the grant from the
DAF to an active charity at a later date. This can
have multiple benefits for the foundation: the
transfer counts for purposes of the foundation’s
payout (because the DAF sponsor is a public
charity), and the foundation can disguise the
source of the funding by flowing the funds
through a DAF.
Neither of these benefits is consistent with the
spirit of the rules that have governed private
foundation conduct since 1969. The payout is
intended to measure distributions to active
charities, not to other investment funds.
Moreover, because of the potential for abuse,
foundations are held to higher standards of
transparency. Allowing foundation-to-DAF
transfers to count for payout purposes is
inconsistent with the policies behind the private
foundation payout and disclosure rules.
To address these concerns, we believe
Congress should provide that foundation-to-DAF
transfers are not qualifying distributions for
purposes of a private foundation’s payout
requirement. Further, to the extent foundations
continue to fund causes through DAFs, sponsors
should have to publicly disclose the foundation
donors on grants from the foundation-advised
DAFs. If Congress wants to preserve the use of
DAFs for private foundations (to allow them to
pool resources with other foundations), it should
require contributions from private foundations in
satisfaction of payouts to be distributed within 15
months of contribution. This is similar to the rule
applicable to distributions from a private
foundation to another private foundation.26
Further, Congress should also close the
loophole that allows private foundations to meet
their 5 percent payout requirement by paying
compensation and travel expenses for family
members. Under current law, a foundation paying
family insiders compensation or reimbursing
their travel costs is treated the same as if the
foundation made a grant to a public charity

performing actual charitable work. This is wrong.
Allowing family compensation and travel to be
treated as charitable creates an incentive for
family members who control the foundation to
spend money on themselves for their personal
benefit and convenience, and to reduce
distributions to public charities. Setting aside
whether it is appropriate for foundations to pay
for the reasonable compensation and foundationrelated travel of family members, those expenses
should not be equated with a payment for the
benefit of an independent charity. Accordingly,
we believe the definition of a qualifying
distribution should be changed to exclude any
payment for the benefit of a foundation donor (or
related party) that is related to compensation or
travel.
Amend Excise Tax to Spur Foundation Grants
Under current law, private foundations
generally are subject to a 2 percent excise tax on
their investment income. However, if a private
foundation increases its annual distribution over
its historic distribution rate, the excise tax is
reduced to 1 percent for that year. This two-tiered
system was intended to reward private
foundations that make progressively larger
grants.
Private foundations have long sought to
repeal the two-tiered excise tax in favor of a single
1 percent excise tax.27 Their argument is that the
two-tiered system is complicated and,
paradoxically, can sometimes discourage large
distributions because it can make it harder for the
private foundation to qualify for the lower excise
tax rate in subsequent years.
Although those arguments have merit, we
believe that there is a better solution that
simplifies the excise tax and fixes the design flaw,
while still providing an incentive for private
foundations to increase their distributions. To that
end, Congress could provide that private
foundations are subject to a 2 percent excise tax
but the tax will be reduced to 1 percent for any
year in which their qualifying distributions are 6
percent or greater. The tax could be reduced

25

The Economist found that some private foundations distribute 90
percent of their qualifying distributions to DAFs. “A Philanthropic
Boom: ‘Donor-Advised Funds,’” The Economist, May 23, 2017.
26

See section 4942(g)(3).
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See e.g., H.R. 2386, Private Foundation Excise Tax Simplification Act
of 2017 (115th Cong.).
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further to zero when qualifying distributions are
at least 8 percent. A mechanism like this would
simplify the excise tax while retaining an
incentive in the tax code for private foundations to
make qualifying distributions above the statutory
minimum of 5 percent, which has often served as
a ceiling on private foundation annual grantmaking.
Conclusion
The charitable sector is in peril. Too few
taxpayers have incentives to participate in
charitable giving, and too many donors can claim
tax benefits without truly relinquishing control of
their donations to an independent charity. On our
current path, the result will be a charitable sector
that reflects the voices of the wealthiest donors,
and where working charities are starved for
resources waiting for foundations and DAF
advisers to release their funds. Fortunately,
solutions are at hand: Expanding the incentive to
all taxpayers in the form of a credit (subject to a
giving floor), suspending the income tax
deduction to DAF sponsors until the contribution
is released from advisory privileges, closing
loopholes that enable foundations and donors to
skirt long-standing legal requirements, and
modifying incentives to foundations to foster
more spending will restore sanity and legitimacy
to the law and establish a strong platform for our
21st-century charitable sector.
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